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Abstract
This paper evaluates the monetary and macroprudential policies that mitigate the procyclical-
ity arising from the interlinkages between current account deficits and financial vulnerabilities.
We develop a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with het-
erogeneous households and collateralised debt. The model predicts that external shocks are
important in driving current account deficits that are coupled with run-ups in house prices and
household debt. In this context, optimal policy features an interest-rate response to credit and
a LTV ratio that countercyclically responds to house price dynamics. By allowing an interest-
rate response to changes in financial variables, the monetary policy authority improves social
welfare, because of the large welfare gains accrued to the Savers. The additional use of a
countercyclical LTV ratio that responds to house prices, increases the ability of borrowers to
smooth consumption over the cycle and is Pareto improving. Domestic and foreign shocks
account for a similar fraction of the welfare gains delivered by such a policy.
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1. Introduction
Between 1974-2006, U.S. house prices and households leverage increased by about 60 and
20 per cent, respectively. See Figure 1. The housing developments were also associated with
a growing current account deficit which reached 6 per cent of GDP by the end of 2006. The
global transmission of such vulnerabilities increased policy makers interest in policies that
could mitigate the procyclicality arising from the interlinkages between global imbalances and
domestic financial vulnerabilities.
This paper evaluates various policy actions. We begin by revisiting the long standing
debate on wether monetary policy should react to financial cycles. We contribute to the debate
by considering a direct response to either credit or house prices in the interest-rate rule of the
central bank. We also explore the effects of macroprudential policy, given the recent policy
debate which questions the traditional (micro) focus of financial stability policies and suggests
the need for preventive (macro-prudential) policies that mitigate financial cycles and their
economy-wide effects. We focus on the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio as a macroprudential tool
and assess the ability of LTV ratio policies to provide a stable provision of loans to households
in the face of both domestic and external shocks.1 The use of dynamic macroprudential policy
requirements has been suggested by The Basel Committee on the Global Financial System.2
We address the role of monetary and macroprudential policy in the interlinkages between
global imbalances and financial vulnerabilities through the lens of a stochastic general equilib-
rium model. First, we develop a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model with heterogeneous households and collateral constraints. At the core of the model
is the borrowers-lenders setup developed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and extended to the
household sector by Iacoviello (2005). The domestic economy features two types of households
that differ in terms of the rate at which they discount the future. In equilibrium, one type
of households borrows whereas the other type lends. Credit constraints arise because lenders
cannot force borrowers to repay. Thus, houses are also used as loan collateral in the domestic
1Note that the LTV ratio has already been used in several countries to restrain credit growth and mitigate
house price cycles, see Lim et al. (2011).
2See Basel Committee on the Global Financial System (2010).
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credit market. We assume that the foreign economy is populated by savers and runs a current
account surplus. The foreign economy is thus willing to extend credit to the domestic economy
and finance their current account deficit.3
We consider both domestic and external sources of economic fluctuations. Capital inflow
shocks are modeled as both preference shocks to the foreign economy and as risk premium
shocks. A positive shock to preferences makes foreign agents more patient and, thus, more
willing to save, while a lower risk premium makes foreign borrowing less costly. We show that
foreign shocks lead to both an increase in capital inflows and a persistent current account
deficit. The greater availability of foreign funds leads to an increase in domestic consumption
and housing investment. Due to a higher demand for housing, house prices rise, exacerbating
the financial accelerator effect linked to the existence of housing collateral. Domestic shocks,
such as housing preference shocks and credit shocks, generate similar results. However, in the
calibrated version of the model, foreign shocks explain around 50 per cent of the volatility
of the current account and 20 per cent of the variability of house prices. Monetary policy
shocks account for about 30 per cent of the volatility in the current account but do not have a
substantial effect on house prices. Housing preference shocks are an important driver of house
prices and household credit but only explain a limited fraction of fluctuations in the current
account.
In this model’s context, we explore the benefits of policies that target changes in financial
variables. We start by exploring whether monetary policy should explicitly recognize financial
stability goals. To this end we investigate the optimality of an interest-rate response to changes
in financial variables. Further, we investigate whether the use of dynamic LTV ratio policies
can raise social welfare above what monetary policy could achieve by allowing for an interest-
rate response to financial variables. Thus, we assess the additional benefits of allowing the
LTV ratio to vary in a counter-cyclical manner. We first consider the optimal interest-rate
response to changes in household credit or house-prices. We then search for the optimal
LTV ratio response to variables that reflect domestic or global financial cycles. In order to
3Close economy models of the housing market with borrowing constraints have been developed by Iacoviello
(2005) and Campbell and Hercowitz (2005). For open economy extensions, see Christensen et al. (2013) for
a small open economy and Iacoviello and Minetti (2006) and Punzi (2013) for two-country economy versions,
among others.
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draw meaningful conclusions about the desirability of alternative policies, we compare their
performance on the basis of welfare criteria.
Our results show that an interest-rate response to changes in financial variables reduces
macroeconomic volatility. In particular, an interest rate that directly responds to fluctuations
in household credit is preferred in terms of social welfare. However, we find that the social
welfare gains associated with this policy are due to the large welfare gains accrued to the
Savers. An interest rate response to household credit reduces the volatility of both financial
variables and the real interest rate. This results in a reduction in the volatility of the interest
income of Savers which helps to stabilize their housing investment and consumption over the
business cycle. At the same time, by reducing the volatility of financial variables, this policy
limits the amplification effect of the collateral constraint and, thus, the Borrowers’ ability to
invest and consume. As a result, the welfare of one group of agents is increased at the cost of
a reduction in the welfare of the other group.
We argue that the additional use of a countercyclical LTV ratio that optimally responds
to changes in house prices improves social welfare relative to a constant LTV ratio policy.
Limiting leverage and domestic borrowing capacity during periods of expansion and facilitating
the use of credit during recessionary periods helps Borrowers to smooth consumption over
time. In particular, the LTV ratio rule that optimally responds to fluctuations in house prices
eliminates the trade-off between the Savers’ and Borrowers’ welfare. Thus, a policy that
optimally combines an interest rate response to household credit with the use of dynamic
requirements for the loan-to-value (LTV) ratios is Pareto improving.
Further, in terms of stabilization effects, this policy is more successful than others in
reducing the volatility of both financial variables and the real interest rate. The analysis
conducted in this paper does not target the smoothing out of specific shocks. By investigating
the importance of varying sources of fluctuations, we find that the optimality of this policy
is not driven by particular shocks. Indeed, domestic and foreign shocks account for a similar
fraction of the welfare gains delivered by such a policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related liter-
ature. Section 2 presents the details of the model. Section 3 discusses the calibration of the
model. Section 4 reports the quantitative implications and the dynamics of the model. Sec-
tions 5 describes the welfare analysis and Section 6 presents the results under the optimized
rules. Section 7 presents some additional results and Section 8 concludes.
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1.1. Related Literature
The connection between global imbalances and the build-up of domestic financial imbal-
ances has been widely recognized.4 Bernanke (2005) and Bernanke (2010) introduced the
“global saving glut hypothesis”, which argued that countries running current account sur-
pluses have contributed to the permissive financial conditions in the U.S. and encouraged the
recent credit boom. Several authors have documented that large capital inflows have been
used to finance the U.S. economy, notably the housing market, during periods of low domestic
saving rates (e.g. Bertaut et al. (2012), Sa and Wieladek (2011), Sa et al. (2012), Tillmann
(2013), Warnock and Warnock (2009)). Other authors have instead shown that the liber-
alization of the domestic financial market was the driver behind house price dynamics (e.g.
Favilukis et al. (2013)) while some have argued that the run-up in house prices in the U.S.
was mainly due to loose monetary policy (e.g. Taylor (2007), Bracke and Fidora (2012), Borio
and Disyatat (2011)).
Recently, the interaction between global imbalances and the dynamics of house prices and
household debt has also been analyzed using DSGE models. Ferrero (2013) links current
account deficits to house prices in a New-Keynesian open economy model in which the U.S.
borrows from a representative international saver. He finds that a looser monetary policy
combined with lower collateral requirements can explain about 60 per cent of the increase in
real house prices and about 25 per cent of the current account deficit since the 2000s. Other
authors explore the interlinkages between domestic and global imbalances in open economy
models augmented with domestic borrowers and lenders, and collateralized household debt.
In particular, Justiniano et al. (2014) argue that the dynamics of foreign capital flows account
for between one fourth and one third of the recent cycle in the U.S. house prices and household
debt, respectively. Punzi (2013) shows that in a two-country real business cycle model rising
housing prices generate a long-lasting accumulation of external debt, inducing high investment
and low savings. As a result, an economy with a booming housing market needs to finance
4The build up of financial and global imbalances in advanced economies has been at the center of policy and
academic debates even before the recent crisis. Indeed, while during the period of the Great Moderation many
variables showed reduced volatility, the volatility of international capital flows increased, thereby increasing
the vulnerability of the financial system. See Obstfeld (2012) and Borio and Disyatat (2011). Fogli and Perri
(2006) argue that the decreasing volatility in the U.S. business cycle during the period of the Great Moderation
has generated the large and persistent U.S. current account deficit.
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its consumption and investment by accumulating long-lasting foreign debt which result in a
current account deficit. This effect is amplified by high financial integration and financial
deregulation. Our paper is similar to the above papers in that we develop a model that
links house prices and current account dynamics. However, we use a more complex setup
that allows us to: (1) account for both domestic and external shocks as potential sources
of fluctuation in both house prices and the current account; (2) assess the importance of
dynamic LTV ratio requirements in the mortgage market as well as their interaction with
monetary policy. Therefore, we develop a stochastic general equilibrium model that combines
the presence of interlinkages between the housing market and the current account, as in Ferrero
(2013), with the presence of domestic borrowers and lenders, as in Justiniano et al. (2014)
and Punzi (2013).5 For the purpose of our paper, it seems necessary to distinguish between
a domestic credit market and international capital flows. Indeed, investigating the role of
LTV ratio policies while at the same time abstracting from the presence of a domestic credit
market does not allow us to distinguish between policies that regulate lending to domestic
households and those aimed at regulating international financial flows.6 Since mortgages are
mainly funded through the domestic mortgage market, it would not be realistic to assume that
changes in the LTV ratio policies also apply to cross border lending. Therefore, we develop a
model that distinguish between international and domestic credit flows.
This paper is also related to the growing literature on macroprudential policy. Several
previous papers have explored the effects of macroprudential tools using stochastic general
equilibrium models (e.g. Angeloni and Faia (2013), Angeloni et al. (2010), Christensen et al.
(2011), Collard et al. (2012), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012)). However, only a few stud-
ies have assessed the role of a dynamic use of macroprudential instruments in models of the
housing market. Using closed-economy models of the housing market, Kannan et al. (2012)
and Angelini et al. (2014) show that an active use of macroprudential instruments, such as
LTV ratios or capital requirements, generates sizable gains when the economy is hit by fi-
nancial shocks. Lambertini et al. (2013) show that countercyclical LTV ratio requirements
coupled with an interest-rate response to financial variables is socially optimal in a model with
5The analysis developed by Justiniano et al. (2014) abstracts from cyclical fluctuations and varying sources
of uncertainty, whereas the findings presented by Punzi (2013) are based on a model of the real business.
6The analysis of policies that regulate cross-border lending and international credit flows is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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run-ups in house prices that are induced by news-shock-driven cycles. Allowing a fraction of
households to employ simple moving-average forecast rules, Gelain et al. (2013) argue that
a debt-to-income type constraint is the most effective macroprudential tool to dampen the
resulting excess volatility in house prices and debt. In this paper, we extend the standard
DSGE housing model (i.e. a model with heterogeneity in time preferences and housing as
a collateral) by introducing a role for housing market imperfections in the propagation of
international business cycles. Thus, we contribute to previous findings by exploring the ef-
fectiveness of dynamic LTV ratio requirements and their interaction with monetary policy to
ensure the stability of the financial system when both domestic and external shocks hit the
economy.7
2. The Model
The model analyzes two large economies: a domestic and a foreign country.8 Our frame-
work combines heterogeneity of time preferences with collateral constraints. It also features
housing market imperfections in the propagation of international business cycles. The do-
mestic economy is populated by two types of households that trade domestic loanable bonds:
patient (denoted by 1) and impatient (denoted by 2). Patient households have a higher propen-
sity to save, i.e. β1 > β2. Housing is treated as a durable good with its demand depending
on both the service flow and asset value of housing units. The service flow is assumed to be
proportional to the real value of the individual housing stock holding. The model allows for
constrained agents who collateralize the value of their homes. This financial friction results
in the familiar financial accelerator mechanism. The economy is also populated by perfectly
competitive intermediate-goods-producing firms, retailers that operate in a monopolistically
competitive market, capital and house producers, and a monetary authority that follows a
standard Taylor-type interest rate rule. Finally, the domestic country borrows from the foreign
country which is populated only by patient agents (denoted by s).
7See Bank of International Settlements 2010.
8For simplicity, the model assumes the domestic and foreign economies are at equal size.
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2.1. Households
Households supply labour and derive utility from consumption, cj,t, housing services, hj,t,
and hours worked, Lj,t,
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
(βj)
t
[
ln(cj,t) + γh,t κ lnhj,t − vL
η
(Lj,t)
η
]
,
where j = {1, 2} denotes the two types of households and κ is the housing weight in the utility.
As common in the literature, housing services are assumed to be proportional to the stock of
houses held by the household and γh,t is a shock to the preference for housing services.
9
Lenders. Patient households accumulate properties for housing purposes, h1,t, trade
domestic-currency loanable bonds, b1,t, and foreign-currency bonds, b
∗
t , and receive dividends
from firms, Ft. They also invest in physical capital, kt, that is then rented to the final-goods-
producing firms at the rate Rkt . Thus, they maximize their expected utility subject to the
following budget constraint
c1,t + qh,t(h1,t − (1− δh)h1,t−1) + qk,t(kt − (1− δk)kt−1) + b1,t + stb∗t = ...
= w1,tL1,t +R
k
t kt−1 +
Rt−1b1,t−1
pit
+ st
ςt−1R∗t−1b
∗
t−1
pi∗t
+ Ft,
(1)
where qh,t is the price of housing, qk,t is the price of capital, w1,t are real wages, pit = Pt/Pt−1
and pi∗t = P ∗t /P ∗t−1 are, respectively, the domestic and foreign gross inflation rate, and st is the
real exchange rate. The stock of housing and capital depreciate at rates δh and δk, respectively.
All the variables, except for the gross nominal interest rates on domestic and foreign bonds,
Rt, and R
∗
t , are expressed in real terms. The return on foreign debt depends on a country
specific risk premium, ςt, that is required for the model to feature a stationary distribution.
10
This risk premium, ςt, is a positive convex function that depends on the ratio of net foreign
assets to domestic output:
ςt = exp
[
ϕ
(
stb
∗
t
Yt
)
+ γς,t
]
,
where γς represents a risk-premium shock.
Borrowers. Impatient households maximize their expected utility subject to the following
budget constraint
c2,t + qh,t(h2,t − (1− δh)h2,t−1) = w2,tL2,t − Rt−1b2,t−1
pit
+ b2,t , (2)
9See, for example Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Liu et al. (2013).
10See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) for further details.
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and a borrowing constraint:
b2t ≤ mEt qh,t+1pit+1h2t
Rt
γm,t. (3)
Borrowing is limited to a fraction of the value of the borrowers’ housing stock, where
(1−m) is the cost that lenders pay when repossessing the asset in the case of default.11 We
assume that agents’ funding conditions may change due to the occurrence of a temporary
shock to the valuation of the collateral asset, i.e. a credit shock, γm,t.
12 Impatient households
do not have direct access to foreign lending.
2.2. Firms and Price Setting
The Intermediate Sector. There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms
indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] that produce intermediate goods, y(i), using the following technology:
y(i)t = γz,t
[
(L(i)1,t)
γ (L(i)2,t)
1−γ
]1−α
k(i)αt−1 , (4)
where γz,t is an aggregate productivity shock, k is rented capital, L1 and L2 is labour supplied
by patient and impatient agents, respectively. As in Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri
(2010), we assume that different labour types are complements.13
We introduce price rigidities in the model following the New Keynesian literature. Thus,
at time t, each intermediate firm revises its price with a probability (1−θ) as in Calvo (1983),
leading to the following New Keynesian Phillips curve:
log
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
= β1
[
Et log
(
Pt+1
Pt
)]
+ pi log
(
Xt
X
)
(5)
11It is possible to show that, in the present framework, impatient households borrow up to the maximum in
the neighborhood of the deterministic steady state. Consider the Euler equation of the impatient household
evaluated at the deterministic steady state µ2 =
(
1− β2
β1pi
)
Uc2 > 0, where µ2 is the Lagrange multiplier
associated to the borrowing constraint.
12An exogenous change in the valuation of the collateral asset could reflect endogenous variations in the
access to credit generated by credit supply shocks originated in the banking sector (which are not modelled
in the present framework). Thus, this change is independent from the borrowers’ decisions. For a similar
modelling of credit shocks see also Khan and Thomas (2013), Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2012), Guerrieri and
Lorenzoni (2011) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
13The primary motivation for this assumption is to obtain a closed-form solution for the steady-state of the
model.
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where pi =
(1−θ)(1−β1θ)
θ and Xt represents the marginal cost of production. Intermediate firms
are owned by the patient households.
The Final-Goods-Producing Firms. The final good, Yt, is produced by perfectly competi-
tive firms using yt(i) units of each type of intermediate good i and a constant return to scale,
a diminishing marginal product, and a constant elasticity of substitution technology:
Yt ≤
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
ξ−1
ξ di
] ξ
ξ−1
, (6)
where ξ > 1 is the constant-elasticity-of-substitution parameter. The price of an intermediate
good, yt(i), is denoted by Pt(i) and is taken as given by the competitive final-good-producing
firms. Solving for cost minimization yields a constant-price-elasticity demand function for each
goods type i which is homogeneous to degree one in the total final output, yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−ξ
yt,
and the domestic price index Pt =
[∫ 1
0 Pt(i)
1−ξdi
]1/(1−ξ)
.
2.3. Capital Producers
Capital producers combine a fraction of the final goods purchased from retailers as invest-
ment goods, Ik,t, to combine it with the existing capital stock in order to produce new capital
goods.14 Capital production is subject to an adjustment cost specified as
ψk
2
(
Ik,t
kt−1
− 1
)2
Ik,t−1,
where ψk governs the slope of the capital producers adjustment cost function. Capital pro-
ducers choose the level of Ik,t that maximizes their profits
max
Ik,t
qkt Ik,t −
(
Ik,t +
ψk
2δk
(
Ik,t
kt−1
− δk
)2
kt−1
)
.
From profit maximization, it is possible to derive the supply of capital
qkt =
[
1 +
ψk
2δk
(
Ik,t
Ik,t−1
− 1
)]
, (7)
where qkt is the relative price of capital. In the absence of investment adjustment costs, q
k
t ,is
constant and equal to one.
The usual capital accumulation equation holds
Ik,t = kt − (1− δk) kt−1. (8)
14See, among others, Bernanke et al. (1999), Christiano et al. (2005) and Christensen and Dib (2008).
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2.4. Housing Producers
We assume that housing producers act in a way that is analogous to the production of
capital. That is, they combine final goods with the existing housing stock and produce new
units of installed houses. Housing production is subject to an adjustment cost specified as
ψh
2δh
(
Ih,t
ht−1
− δh
)2
ht−1. For a similar formulation, see Aoki et al. (2004) and Christensen et al.
(2013). From profit maximization, it is possible to derive the supply of housing
qht =
[
1 +
ψh
2δh
(
Ih,t
ht−1
− δh
)]
, (9)
where new housing capital goods are sold at a price qht . This equation is similar to the Tobin’s
q relationship for investment in which the marginal cost of a unit of housing is related the
marginal cost of adjusting the housing stock.15
The aggregate stock of housing, ht = h1,t + h2,t, is accumulated according to
Ih,t = ht − (1− δh)ht−1. (10)
2.5. Monetary Policy
We assume that, in the benchmark economy, the monetary authority follows a simple
interest-rate rule
Rt =
(pit
pi
)φpi
εr,t (11)
15A variety of approaches have been followed in the literature regarding the modelling of the supply of
housing. Some authors abstract from housing investment and assume that the supply of houses is fixed in
the short run (i.e. Iacoviello (2005) and Ferrero (2013)); others assume that housing are produced just by
using final goods, thus, the stock of housing evolves according to the standard investment equation without
adjustment costs (i.e. Campbell and Hercowitz (2005), Campbell and Hercowitz (2009), Calza et al. (2013)
and Justiniano et al. (2014)) and some also assume that housing producers act in a way that is analogous to
the production of capital. That is, they combine final goods with the existing housing stock and produce new
units of installed houses and housing production is subject to an adjustment cost (i.e. Aoki et al. (2004) and
Christensen et al. (2013)). An alternative formulation for the production of housing would require an explicit
production function as for instance in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). This latter modelling choice would not affect
the transmission of domestic and foreign shocks. Indeed, as already highlighted by Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
“land works in a way similar to an adjustment cost on housing, since it limits the extent to which the housing
stock can be adjusted. In response to shocks, a larger land share reduces the volatility of housing investment
and increases the volatility of house prices”. Our model’s results under an explicit production function of
housing are available upon request.
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where the nominal interest rate is adjusted in response to deviations of inflation from its
target, pitpi , and εr,t is an i.i.d. monetary policy shock.
2.6. Current Account Equation
Domestic output, Yt, can be consumed, invested or exported
Yt +D
∗
t = Ct + qk,tI
k
t + qh,tI
h
t ,
where Ct = c1,t+c2,t, Ih,t = ht−(1− δh)ht−1, Ik,t = kt−(1− δk) kt−1 andD∗t= s
(
b∗t − R
∗
t−1b
∗
t−1
pi∗t
)
−
ϕ
2 (b
∗
t − b∗)2 .
The trade balance equals
TBt = Yt − Ct − qk,tIkt − qh,tIht = −D∗t , (12)
and
CAt = −TBt +
s(R∗t−1 − 1)b∗t−1
pi∗t
= s
(
b∗t −
b∗t−1
pi∗t
)
.
The last equation states that the current account is the sum of the service account, i.e. the
interest required to service existing debt, and the trade account, which is the trade balance
expressed as the difference between output, consumption and investments.16
2.7. Rest of the World
The foreign economy is assumed to be a saver economy that runs a current account sur-
plus. For simplicity, there is only one representative household in the foreign economy. This
household also holds all the capital rented to firms, workers in the production of consumption
goods and saves. The foreign agent problem is similar to the domestic Savers’. The foreign
agent’s expected utility is summarized by
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βtsγb,t
[
ln(cs,t) + κ lnhs,t − vL
η
(Ls,t)
η
]
,
where βts = β
t
1 and γb,t is an exogenous shock to the foreign consumer’s impatience.
Firms produce consumption goods, capital and new houses as in (4)-(11). Adjustment costs
are defined identically to those in the domestic economy. Price rigidities are also introduced
as in the domestic economy, see (5). The foreign monetary authority follows an interest rate
rule as in (12).
16A similar definition is found in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Ghironi (2006).
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2.8. Exogenous Factors
Shocks to productivity, γz,t, house preferences, γh,t, domestic borrowing limits, γm,t, the
risk premium, γς,t, and the foreign discount factor, γb,t, follow an autoregressive process of
order one
ln γt = ργ ln γt−1 + εγ,t,
where γ = {z, h,m, ς, b} , ργ is the persistence parameter and εγ,t is a i.i.d. white noise process
with mean zero and variance σ2γ . Monetary policy shocks, εr,t, are instead i.i.d.
3. Calibration
The model is calibrated at quarterly frequency using US National Accounts and Flow of
Funds data over the period 1974:1-2008:1. For the foreign economy, we use data on real house
prices and the short nominal interest rate for the G7 excluding the US.17 Due to limitations
in the availability of cross-country data on house prices, the sample used for the calibration
begins in 1974:1. Figures 2 and 3 plot the data used in the calibration, whereas Table 1
reports the targets used for the calibration.
Table 2 reports the parameter values. A first set of parameters describing preferences
and technology are calibrated using steady state targets. The discount factor of the Savers,
β1, is set equal to 0.99, such that the average annual rate of return is about 4%. In the
model, the Savers own 100% of physical capital wealth. Thus, we consider the Savers to
represent the top wealth decile of households in the model economy. Wolff (2010), using
the 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2007 Federal Reserve Board’s Surveys of Consumer
Finances, documents that the share of income and the share of housing wealth held by the
top decile of US households are about 40% and 60%, respectively.18 Thus, we calibrate the
discount factor of the borrowers, β2, and the production parameter, γ, in order to match two
ratios for the borrowers: a share of income of about 60% and a share of housing wealth of
about 40%. The Borrower’s discount factor is somewhat lower than the value used by other
authors.19 However, it does fall in the range of the empirical distribution of discount factors
17We thank Luciana Juvenal of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for kindly providing this data. Source:
Fratzscher et al. (2010).
18The Savers’ income share of 40% is also consistent with the long-run average measured by Piketty and
Saez (2003). Updated data through 2010 are available from Emmanuel Saez’s website.
19See, among others, Iacoviello (2005), Campbell and Hercowitz (2009), Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
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calculated by Carroll and Samwick (1997) using information on the elasticity of assets with
respect to uncertainty, i.e. the two standard deviation bands range in the interval (0.91, 0.99).
The depreciation of the housing stock, δh, is calibrated in order to match a ratio of resi-
dential investment to GDP of 4.5574%. The loan-to-value ratio, m, and the housing weight
in the utility, κ, are jointly calibrated to match (i) a ratio of total housing wealth to GDP of
127.849%, and (ii) a ratio of household credit to total housing wealth of 45.45%. The resulting
loan-to-value ratio is 0.73. Under this calibration, the model is also able to deliver a ratio of
household credit to GDP of 55.30%, as in the data.
The following steady state relationship is used to calibrate the stock of foreign debt relative
to annual GDP (b∗) in order to match the US trade deficit to annual GDP figure of 2.73%:
b∗(1−R∗) = −TB (13)
We borrow the remaining parameters from the existing literature. Since the labor disutility
parameter νL only affects the scale of the economy, we normalize it to one. The parameter η
is set to 2 such that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply equals one. The average net markup
equals 10 per cent and the Calvo parameter, θ, is set to 0.67. We set the capital share in
production, α, equal to 0.30 and the depreciation of productive capital δk to 0.025. The
adjustment cost parameters are set equal to 0.5.
The second set of parameters determining the stochastic properties of the model are cali-
brated to match key moments of the data. All series are in real terms and their log value is
linearly detrended. First, we parameterize the technology shock, γz,t, following the standard
Solow residuals approach. We construct a series for the capital stock using end-of-period bal-
ance sheet data from the Flow of Funds Accounts as in Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Given
the value of α and the empirical series for GDP, the stock of capital and total hours worked
we construct the zt series.
The standard deviations of the housing preference shock, σh,t, credit shock, σm,t, the
monetary policy shock, σr,t, the risk premium shock, σς,t, and the foreign discount factor, σb,t,
are jointly calibrated to match the unconditional standard deviation of the current account
as a share of domestic GDP, the standard deviation of real house prices relative to GDP,
the standard deviation of housing value relative to household credit, the relative standard
deviation of domestic and foreign real house prices, the relative standard deviation of domestic
and foreign short term interest rates. Hitting these targets requires an autoregressive process
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of all shocks equal to 0.98, except for the monetary policy shock that is assumed to be i.i.d.
Table 2 reports the values of the calibrated parameters.
4. Quantitative Implications and Model Dynamics
In this section, we explore the transmission mechanism of domestic and foreign shocks
and we assess the relative importance of shocks for key macroeconomic variables. Figure 4
analyzes the impact of risk premiums (solid line) and foreign preference shocks (starred line).
A negative 1 per cent innovation to the risk premium, γς,t, increases the willingness of foreign
investors to accumulate U.S. assets. This is because U.S. assets are considered safer and more
liquid, while a positive shock to foreign preferences, γb,t, makes foreign agents more patient
and, thus, more willing to save. Both shocks lead to an increase in capital inflows and thus, a
current account deficit. On impact, a 1 per cent increase in γς,t and γb,t, leads to a change in the
current account of 7.5 per cent. In the case of a foreign preference shock, the current account
quickly returns to the steady state level, and reverses after 5 quarters, whereas a risk premium
shock leads to a more persistent current account deficit. The greater availability of foreign
funds generates a greater availability of credit to domestic borrowers as well as an increase in
the domestic consumption of both non-durable goods and housing. Due to the higher demand
for housing, house prices rise which exacerbate the financial accelerator effects linked to the
existence of housing collateral. In response to inflow shocks, the model generates co-movement
between domestic consumption and housing production. Household credit increases by about
30 and 50 per cent in response to a 1 per cent innovation to the foreign preference and risk
premium shock, respectively. The increase in domestic consumption and house prices is more
moderate. Both rise by around 5 per cent for the foreign preference shocks and 6 per cent
for the risk premium shock. The increase in housing investment is less pronounced. These
findings are consistent with both Bernanke (2005) and Sa and Wieladek (2011) and support
the global savings glut hypothesis.
Figure 5-6 show the impulse responses to domestic shocks. In Figure 5, we analyse the
effects of a positive one per cent housing preference shock (solid line) and credit shock (starred
line). An increase in the weight of housing service in the utility function, γh,t, makes house-
holds more willing to consume houses rather than consumption goods. Credit shocks instead
temporarily change the households’ access to domestic credit due to variations in the valu-
ation of the collateral asset, γm,t. Both shocks generate an increase in the policy interest
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rate, real house prices and household credit. The increase in the policy interest rate attracts
foreign savings and also makes domestic savers willing to borrow from abroad in order to lend
domestically at a higher rate. Consumption and residential investment also increase. The do-
mestic economy runs a current account deficit of 0.25 per cent and 0.4 per cent for the housing
preference shock and credit shock, respectively. The economy displays larger amplification in
response to a credit shock relative to a housing preference shock. However, in both cases, the
impact on house prices and the current account is more moderate than in the case of foreign
shocks.
Finally, in Figure 6, we report the impulse responses to a 1 per cent positive productivity
shock (solid line) as well as an expansionary monetary policy shock (starred line). Both
shocks generate an increase in house prices, household credit, consumption and residential
investment. However, due to expansionary conditions in the domestic economy, the saver
optimally reduces the foreign debt, leading to a current account surplus.
In order to understand the relative importance of the shocks in the theoretical model, we
report their contribution to the volatility of the main variables of interest, such as current
account (to GDP), house prices and household credit. Results are reported in Table 3. Foreign
shocks account for about 50 per cent of the volatility in the current account to GDP and
about 20 per cent of house prices. Housing preference shocks explain about 70 per cent of
the volatility in house prices but only 12 per cent of volatility in the current account to GDP.
Domestic shocks explain almost all the variation of household credit, with about 66 per cent of
its variation accounted for by the housing preference shock and 30 per cent by credit shocks.
Monetary policy shocks account for 30 per cent of the volatility of the current account to
GDP but have a limited effect on house prices and household credit.
In sum, foreign shocks account for a sizable fraction of volatility in the current account as
a share of GDP, followed by monetary policy shocks. Housing preference shocks are the most
important domestic shocks in explaining the volatility of house prices and household credit.20
20Productivity shocks have no influence in the variance decomposition of the current account, house price
and household debt.
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5. Welfare
In order to draw meaningful conclusions about the desirability of alternative policies,
we compare their performance on the basis of welfare criteria. By using household welfare
as the objective function of the policy authority, we avoid the problem of adopting ad-hoc
loss functions that may not be optimal in this model. The welfare analysis is based on the
approach commonly used in the DSGE literature.21 The individual welfare of each household
is measured by the conditional expectation of lifetime utility as of time t
Vjt ≡ maxEt
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtjU(cjt, hjt, ljt)
]
Thus, we augment the set of equilibrium conditions of the model with two equations and two
unknowns V1t and V2t
Vjt = U(cjt, hjt, ljt) + β
t
jEtVjt+1, (14)
where Vjt = {V1t, V2t} denotes the welfare of the Borrowers and Savers, respectively. We
aggregate individual welfare in a social welfare function, i.e. a weighted average of the welfare
of the two groups of agents:
V˜t ≡ [ϕ1V1t + ϕ2V2t] , (15)
where ϕj = (1−βj). The weights are chosen such that, given a constant consumption stream,
the Borrowers and the Savers achieve the same level of utility. Note that, without correcting
for the difference in the discount factors, the social welfare function would deliver an implicit
higher weight on welfare for the Savers.22
Following previous literature, we compute the welfare implied by the various rules, condi-
tional on the initial state (t = 0) being the deterministic steady state.23 As in Schmitt-Grohe
21See among others, Kim and Kim (2003), Faia and Monacelli (2007), Erceg et al. (2000), Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2005b), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007a), and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007b).
22The social weights used in the analysis ensure the same utility weights across agents that discount future
utility at different rates, as in Mendicino and Pescatori (2008). Let us assume unit weights in (15), i.e.
ϕ1 = ϕ2 = 1. In the steady state, Savers’ lifetime utility is V1 =
1
(1−β1)U1, whereas Borrowers’ is V2 =
1
(1−β2)U2.
Thus, V˜ ≡
[
1
(1−β1)U1 +
1
(1−β2)U2
]
with 1
(1−β2) <
1
(1−β1) . Given the parameter values assigned to β1 and β2,
the weight on the welfare of Savers is five times higher than that on Borrowers. In contrast, weighting V1 by
ϕ1 = (1 − β1) and V2 by ϕ2 = (1 − β2), avoids spurios redistribution effects. See Lambertini et al. (2013) for
sensitivity to the use of alternative weighting criteria.
23See for instance Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007a) and Faia and Monacelli (2007).
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and Uribe (2007a), we assess the effects of simple policy rules, i.e. rules that imply a response
of the policy instrument to a few observable macroeconomic variables. These variables guar-
antee local uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium and are optimal in the sense
that they maximize social welfare. Thus, the optimized interest-rate and LTV ratio rules
are ranked in terms of social welfare levels. The welfare effects of the alternative rules are
quantified on the basis of a consumption-equivalent measure, i.e. the percentage increase in
individual consumption that would make the welfare of each type of agent under the base-
line policy equal to the welfare under the optimized rule. Table 4 panel A.1 (rule i) reports
the individual and social welfare levels under the baseline policy used for the calibration of
the model, i.e. a monetary policy rule that features a 1.5 interest rate response to inflation
coupled with a constant LTV ratio m equal to 0.73.
6. Optimized Policy Rules
In recent decades, there has been a great deal of emphasis on assessing the ability of
monetary policy to dampen housing and credit cycles.24 However, since the recent financial
crisis, the design of a new policy framework that restrains the build-up of credit and house
price dynamics has been central to both policy and academic debates. A large number of
papers explores the macroeconomic effects of macroprudential policies, such as LTV ratios,
capital requirements and reserve requirements in general equilibrium models. In the following,
we first explore the optimality of an interest-rate response to financial variables. Further,
we study the effects of alternative LTV ratio policies in stabilizing fluctuations in household
credit and housing prices.25
6.1. Interest Rate Response to Financial Variables
First, we investigate whether monetary policy should explicitly target fluctuations in fi-
nancial variables. Thus, we evaluate the welfare implications of alternative interest-rate rules
24See, among others, Bernanke and Gertler (2001), Gilchrist and Leahy (2002), Faia and Monacelli (2007)
and Iacoviello (2005).
25This model is linearized around a deterministic steady-state. Thus, it is not able to deal with bubbles
or other types of unsustainable dynamics. Hence, the purpose of the proposed macroprudential policies is to
stabilize house price cycles and credit cycles rather than correcting imbalances.
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that react to either changes in household credit or house prices
Rt =
(pit
pi
)φpi ( yt
yt−1
)φy ( xt
xt−1
)φx
εr,t (16)
where yt is output and xt = {bt, qt}.26 Table 4 (panel A.2) reports the combination of
parameters that deliver the highest welfare given an interest-rate rule that targets either
household credit (rule iii) or house prices (rule iv). Both rules feature a moderate response
to financial variables and no response to GDP growth.27 The optimized rules also require an
aggressive response to inflation.
It is important to highlight that the social welfare maximizing interest-rate response to
financial variables is not a Pareto improvement beginning from the baseline policy, i.e. (rule i).
In other words, under an interest-rate response to financial variables, the welfare of one group
of agents is increased at the cost of a reduction in the welfare of the other group. Responding
to financial variables improves social welfare only due to the large individual welfare gains
accrued to the Savers.
A nominal interest-rate response to changes in financial variables implies a more contained
response of the real interest rate to shocks and thus, a less sizable effect on the housing
investment and borrowing decisions of households. Let us consider the case of an unanticipated
expansionary of monetary policy. See Figure 8. This shock induces agents to increase their
current expenditures. Demand pressure raises current inflation and the current ex-post real
rate declines. Similar to Ferrero (2013), expansionary monetary policy generate a lower real
interest rate and an increase in house prices.28 Given the collateral constraint, which allows
households to borrow more against the higher value of their house, and given the lower desire
to save, Borrowers increase their level of indebtedness and housing investment. As implied by
the Euler equation, a reduction in real interest rates affects the Savers’ consumption/saving
plan allocation. As a result, they reduce investment in housing. When the interest rate reacts
to the increase in financial variables (rule iii) and (iv) the real interest rate declines by less.
Thus, Savers benefit from a less substantial reduction in their interest rate income and, in
26We search over a three dimensional grid, with the ranges for the three parameters being [1.1,10] for φpi,
[0,3] for φy, and [0,3] for φx. The grid step for each parameter is 0.1.
27As reported in (rule ii), a positive response to output growth reduces social welfare even in the case of the
baseline interest-rate rule that does not include a response to changes in financial variables.
28However, the present model can generate this result abstracting from exchange rate regime.
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turn, reduce less of their housing investment. Since this policy limits the amplification effect
of the collateral constraint, by mitigating the increase in housing value, Borrowers suffer from
a reduced increase in the availability of credit. The effect is more sizable under an interest-rate
response to variations in household credit.
Figure 7 shows how individual and social welfare change with respect to an interest-rate
response to the financial variables while leaving the output and inflation coefficients unchanged
to the optimized values. Some observations are in order. First, the optimized responses to
inflation and output deliver higher social and Savers welfare even in the absence of a response
to financial variables, i.e. φb = φq = 0. Regarding (rule iv), the Borrowers welfare is always
below the baseline policy (rule i) welfare level, independently of the response to house prices.
In contrast, for the Borrowers welfare to be above the level reached under the baseline policy,
(rule iii) would require a much more aggressive response to credit growth than the coefficient
that maximizes social welfare.
6.2. Dynamic LTV Requirements
Second, we investigate the implications of adopting dynamic LTV ratio requirements as
macroprudential tools. In particular, we allow the LTV ratio to vary in a counter-cyclical
manner around a pre-established steady state cap, m. We explore the effectiveness of a
countercyclical LTV ratio rule of the following class
mt
m
=
(xt
x
)−ϕx
,
where xt denotes a variety of key measures of macroeconomic and financial conditions, i.e.
xt =
{
qht , b2t, yt,
qht
q∗t
}
and ϕx ≥ 0. The optimality of a countercyclical response of the LTV ratio
to output, household credit and house prices has already been investigated in the context of
closed economy models of the housing market.29 In this paper, we also consider the differential
between domestic and foreign real house prices, a variable that may capture global financial
cycles.
Table 5 reports the coefficients of the LTV ratio rules that respond to each of the selected
variables and deliver the highest welfare. The analysis is conducted conditional on monetary
policy being conducted as in the optimized (rule iii) or (iv). We also include the welfare levels
29See for instance Lambertini et al. (2013) and Angelini et al. (2014).
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under the constant LTV ratio, i.e. mt = m, for reference. We compute the welfare gains of
adopting each optimized LTV ratio rule with respect to the policy of a constant LTV ratio by
compensating variations. That is, we measure the percentage change in consumption under
the constant LTV ratio case that would give households the same unconditional expected
utility as in the stochastic economy under each optimized rule.
Panel B.1 of Table 5 explores the optimality of an active LTV ratio policy when monetary
policy follows (rule iii). LTV rules that respond to household credit, output or the house price
differential are not optimal. In contrast, adopting a dynamic LTV ratio rule that responds
in a countercyclical manner to house prices increases social welfare and results in a Pareto
improvement. Further, allowing for a countercyclical response to house prices resolves the
trade-off between Borrowers’ and Savers’ welfare introduced by the interest-rate response to
household debt. Indeed, (rule vii) implies a welfare level for both agents that is higher than
the level under both (rule iii) and the baseline policy (rule i) (see Table 4).
Panel B.2 of Table 5 reports the results for the optimized LTV ratio rules under the
assumption that monetary policy follows (rule iv). Allowing for a countercyclical response
of the LTV ratio to either changes in house prices or in the house price differential improves
upon a constant LTV ratio in terms of social welfare. However, differently from (rule vii),
the optimized LTV ratio (rule xi) and (xii) exacerbate the trade-off between Savers’ and
Borrowers’ welfare. In fact, compared with (rule iv), both rules induce even larger gains for
the Savers and larger costs for the Borrowers. The Borrowers’ welfare level under (rule xi)
and (xii) remains below the welfare level reached under the baseline policy, i.e. (rule i).
In terms of individual welfare, the largest gains for the Savers are experienced under the
optimized interest rate rule that responds to changes in house prices coupled with a LTV
ratio rule that optimally responds to changes in house price (rule xi) followed by a LTV ratio
that respond to changes in the house price differential (rule xii). In contrast, the Borrowers
are better off under the optimized interest-rate response to household credit coupled with the
optimal LTV ratio response to house prices (rule vii). Across all rules, the greatest social
welfare is reached under the policy that features an interest rate response to credit growth
and a countercyclical response of the LTV ratio to house prices (rule vii). Notice that from
the starting point of the baseline policy (rule i) and a constant LTV policy (rule iii), (rule vii)
leads to a Pareto improvement.
In order to develop some intuition about the beneficial effects of a policy that optimally
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combines an interest-rate response to household credit with a LTV ratio response to house
prices, Figure 9 compares the effects of an unanticipated monetary policy loosening under (rule
iii) and (vii). A LTV ratio that countercyclically reacts to changes in house prices, reduces
the increase credit availability in response to an expansionary shock. A countercyclical LTV
prevents a strong relaxation of the collateral constraint stemming from upward pressure on
house prices. This, in turn, implies a larger decline in the real interest rate compared with
the case of a constant LTV ratio (rule iii). Thus, the increase in the availability of credit
is dampened even though servicing loans is less costly. This policy improves the Borrowers’
ability to invest in housing. As for the Savers, the larger decline in their interest income results
on impact in a more pronounced decline in housing demand. The initial effect is, however,
counter-balanced by a larger increase over the medium term. Similar results hold for the other
shocks.
7. Understanding the Mechanism
In the following, we evaluate the ability of the optimized rules to stabilize macroeconomic
and financial cycles. Further, we assess the role of alternative sources of business cycle fluc-
tuations in determining social welfare gains.
7.0.1. Stabilization Effect
This paper’s analysis follows the more recent strand of the monetary policy literature and
directly, evaluates alternative policies on their ability to improve social welfare. Thus, we
do not target the volatility of a particular set of variables, as in the traditional loss function
approach. The results presented in the previous section, however, show that the Pareto-
improving policy, i.e. (rule vii), mitigates financial cycles and dampens the response of the
real interest rate to shocks when compared to the baseline case (rule i).
In the following, we assess the stabilization effects of the alternative policies presented in
Section 6 by investigating their impact on the unconditional volatility of key variables. See
Table 6 (panel I).30 Panel A of Table 6 considers the optimized interest-rate rule that targets
30The model-based standard deviations are reported in terms of their ratios to the values delivered under
the baseline policy (rule i). Thus, figures larger than unity indicate higher volatility than what is delivered by
the baseline policy (rule i). The opposite is true for values below one.
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changes in household credit, whereas Panel B refers to the interest-rate rule that targets
changes in real house prices. For each interest rate rule, we consider both a constant LTV
and a countercyclical LTV ratio.
Compared to the baseline policy, all optimized rules reduce the volatility of both household
credit and total consumption relative to output. The interest-rate rule that targets house
prices (rule iv) also reduces the volatility of house prices and housing investment. In contrast,
the interest-rate rule that targets credit growth (rule iii) reduces the volatility of the real
interest rate. LTV ratios that optimally respond to financial variables (rule vii, xi and xii)
further reduce the volatility of total consumption to output. Note that a LTV ratio response to
the differential between domestic and foreign house prices (rule xii) also reduces the volatility
of both international credit flows and the house price differential. Overall, the policy (rule
vii) is more successful than other policies in reducing the volatility of both financial variables
and the real interest rate.
It is important to highlight that the reduction in the volatility of total consumption fea-
tured by all optimized policies is driven by a reduction in the volatility of the consumption by
Savers. In fact, under most optimized rules, the volatility of Borrower’ consumption is larger
than under the baseline policy (rule i). The only exception is (rule vii), i.e. the interest-rate
rule that responds to credit growth coupled with a LTV ratio that countercyclically responds
to house prices. Differently from other policies, (rule vii) is a Pareto improvement. See Tables
4 and 5.
The underlying mechanism behind the welfare and macroeconomic effects of (rule vii) is
linked to two main features of the theoretical model: collateralizes debt and debt contracts in
nominal terms. As highlighted in previous papers, debt contracts in nominal terms introduce
private risk generated by the uncertain returns.31 Thus, in our model, the policy authority
can improve social welfare by stabilizing the ex-post real interest rate which helps to offset
the distortion related to the presence of debt contracts in nominal terms. The stabilization
of the real interest rate resulting from an interest-rate response to household credit reduces
31See Christiano et al. (2004), Christiano et al. (2010) for an analysis on the distortion related to the presence
of assets in nominal terms in a model with financial frictions at the firms’ level, and Mendicino and Pescatori
(2008) for further discussion on the implications of nominal debt contracts in a model with collateralized
household debt.
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the volatility of the interest income of Savers which in turn helps to stabilize their housing
investment and consumption over the cycle. This policy is therefore welfare improving for the
Savers.
The reduction in the volatility of the debt-services also reduces the uncertainty about
the repayment of the debt for the Borrowers. However, by reducing the volatility of finan-
cial variables, this policy also limits the amplification effect of the collateral constraint. An
interest-rate response to household credit coupled with a constant LTV, i.e. (rule iii), reduces
the ability of Borrowers to smooth consumption and investment over the cycle. Thus, it makes
this group of agents worse off compared to the baseline policy (rule i). Panel A documents
the increase in the volatility of Borrowers’ consumption under (rule iii).
The additional use of a countercyclical response of the LTV to house prices (rule vii)
tightens the collateral constraint during periods of expansion and relaxes the borrowing con-
straint during periods of recession. This helps Borrowers smooth consumption and housing
investment over time and improves their welfare.
Table 6 also discloses the changes in the level of aggregate variables under each policy
experiment. Household credit and housing investment are highest under (rule vii). This result
is in line with the stabilization properties of the same policy framework. Overall, the large
social welfare gains reported under (rule vii) are associated with sizable stabilization effects
and a higher long-run level of credit, investment and, thus, consumption, as summarized by
the higher social welfare level.
7.0.2. Domestic vs External Shocks
The analysis conducted in this paper does not attempt to design optimal policies condi-
tional on some particular shocks. Instead, it is based on the assumption that various sources
of business cycle fluctuations can affect the economy. Thus, we do not target the smoothing
out of specific shocks. In the following, we investigate what happens when the economy is
only subject to either domestic or external shocks. To address this question, we compare the
performance of the optimized policy rules under three cases: all shocks, only domestic shocks,
only foreign shocks.
Table 7 reports the results. For each set of shocks, Panel A of Table 7 reports the wel-
fare levels under the baseline policy (rule i), whereas Panel B reports the results under the
optimized interest-rate rules that target household credit (rule iii), or house prices (rule iv).
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Panel C reports the results under the countecyclical LTV ratio policies. All welfare gains are
computed with respect to the baseline policy. Notice that the individual welfare levels under
all shocks are the same as in Tables 4 and 5.
First, let us consider the Pareto improving policy (rule vii). We find that the optimality
of this policy is not driven by particular sources of fluctuations. In fact, both domestic and
foreign shocks account for a similar fraction of the welfare gains delivered by (rule vii). It
is important to highlight that, independently of the sources of fluctuations considered, this
remains the only improving Pareto policy. Thus, both Savers and Borrowers benefit from
a LTV ratio rule that optimally responds to fluctuations in house prices coupled with the
optimized interest-rate rule that responds to credit growth independently of the sources of
fluctuations hitting our model economy.
Regarding the other rules, the ranking across (rule i), (iii) and (iv) holds only under
domestic shocks,. In contrast, under the occurrence of foreign shocks, the gains implied by an
interest-rate response to domestic financial variables vanish if the LTV ratio is constant. See
Panel B. Foreign shocks strongly favour a countercyclical LTV ratio. In particular, (rule xii)
is the social welfare maximizing rule. Differently from (rule vii), the social gains from the use
of this policy framework reflect the large welfare gains accrued to the Savers. It is important
to notice that in the current setup, patient households trade both domestic-currency bonds
and foreign-currency bonds. Thus, this group of agents benefits from the stabilization of
international credit flows implied by a contercyclical LTV ratio response to fluctuations in the
house price differential. Table 6, Panel B reports the standard deviation of the foreign debt
to GDP under the alternative optimized rules.
8. Conclusion
The latest U.S. housing boom was coupled with both a widening of the current account
deficit and increasing capital inflows. In this paper, we contribute to the understanding of (i)
the inter-linkages between the evolution of the U.S. current account balance and house prices,
(ii) the effects of macro-prudential policy and its interaction with monetary policy. We do
this in a framework that mimics the dynamics of the housing market and the current account.
With this purpose in mind, we develop a quantitative model of two large economies calibrated
to match key features of the U.S. and the rest of the G7 countries.
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Our results suggest that risk premium shocks account for a large fraction of variation in the
U.S. current account as a share of GDP and a non-negligible fraction of the volatility of U.S.
house prices. Monetary policy shocks account for a substantial fraction of variations in the
current account but have a limited effect on house prices, while other domestic shocks, such
as housing preference and credit shocks, do not account for a sizable fraction of fluctuations
in the current account.
In the context of this model, we explore the stabilization effects of monetary and LTV
ratio policy which target financial variables. The design of a new policy framework able
to stabilize credit and house price dynamics is central to the current policy debate. Unlike
previous papers, we explore the effects of dynamic LTV ratio requirements in a model that
also considers external shocks. We find that a policy that features a counterciclycal LTV ratio
that responds to house price dynamics and an interest-rate rule that targets credit dampens
macroeconomic and financial fluctuations and is Pareto improving.
26
References
Angelini, P., Neri, S., Panetta, F., 2014. The interaction between capital requirements and
monetary policy. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, forthcoming .
Angeloni, I., Faia, E., 2013. Capital regulation and monetary policy with fragile banks. Journal
of Monetary Economics 60, 311–324.
Angeloni, I., Faia, E., Duca, M.L., 2010. Monetary policy and risk taking. Bruegel Working
Paper .
Aoki, K., Proudman, J., Vlieghe, G., 2004. House prices, consumption, and monetary policy:
a financial accelerator approach. Journal of Financial Intermediation 13, 414–435.
Bernanke, B., 2005. The global saving glut and the u.s. current account deficit. Speech at the
Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economists, Richmond, Virginia .
Bernanke, B., 2010. Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble. Technical Report.
Bernanke, B.S., Gertler, M., 2001. Should central banks respond to movements in asset prices?
The American Economic Review 91, 253–257.
Bernanke, B.S., Gertler, M., Gilchrist, S., 1999. The financial accelerator in a quantitative
business cycle framework. Handbook of Macroeconomics 1, 1341–1393.
Bertaut, C., DeMarco, L.P., Kamin, S., Tryon, R., 2012. Abs inflows to the united states and
the global financial crisis. Journal of International Economics 8, 219–234.
Borio, C., Disyatat, P., 2011. Global imbalances and the financial crisis: Link or no link? BIS
working paper 346.
Bracke, T., Fidora, M., 2012. The macro-financial factors behind the crisis: Global liquidity
glut or global savings glut? North American Journal of Economics and Finance 23, 185
202.
Calza, A., Monacelli, T., Stracca, L., 2013. Housing finance and monetary policy. Journal of
the European Economic Association 11, 101–122.
Campbell, J.R., Hercowitz, Z., 2005. The role of collateralized household debt in macroeco-
nomic stabilization. NBER working paper 11330.
27
Campbell, J.R., Hercowitz, Z., 2009. Welfare implications of the transition to high household
debt. Journal of Monetary Economics 56, 1–16.
Carroll, C.D., Samwick, A.A., 1997. The nature of precautionary wealth. Journal of Monetary
Economics 40, 41–71.
Christensen, I., Corrigan, P., Mendicino, C., Nishiyama, S.I., 2013. Consumption, housing
collateral, and the canadian business cycle. Canadian Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
Christensen, I., Dib, A., 2008. The financial accelerator in an estimated new keynesian model.
Review of Economic Dynamics 11, 155–178.
Christensen, I., Meh, C., Moran, K., 2011. Bank leverage regulation and macroeconomic
dynamic. Bank of Canada Working Paper 32 .
Christiano, L., Ilut, C.L., Motto, R., Rostagno, M., 2010. Monetary policy and stock market
booms. NBER Working Paper No. 16402 .
Christiano, L.J., Eichenbaum, M., Evans, C.L., 2005. Nominal rigidities and the dynamic
effects of a shock to monetary policy. Journal of Political Economy 113, 1–45.
Christiano, L.J., Motto, R., Rostagno, M., 2004. The great depression and the friedman-
schwartz hypothesis. National Bureau of Economic Research .
Collard, F., Dellas, H., Diba, B.T., Loisel, O., 2012. Optimal monetary and prudential policies.
Banque de France Working Paper .
Erceg, C.J., Henderson, D.W., Levin, A.T., 2000. Optimal monetary policy with staggered
wage and price contracts. Journal of Monetary Economics 46, 281–313.
Faia, E., Monacelli, T., 2007. Optimal interest rate rules, asset prices and credit frictions.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31, 3228–3254.
Favilukis, J., Ludvigson, S., Nieuwerburgh, S.V., 2013. Housing and monetary policy, in:
Housing and the Financial Crisis. University of Chicago Press.
Ferrero, A., 2013. House price booms, current account deficits, and low interest rates.
Manuscript prepared for the Dallas Fed/IMF/JMCB Conference on “Housing, Stability
and the Macroeconomy: International Perspectives” .
28
Fogli, A., Perri, F., 2006. The great moderation and the u.s. external imbalance. Monetary
and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan 24,
209–225.
Fratzscher, M., Juvenal, L., Sarno, L., 2010. Asset prices, exchange rates and the current
account. European Economic Review 54, 643–658.
Gelain, P., Lansing, K.J., Mendicino, C., 2013. House prices, credit growth, and excess
volatility: Implications for monetary and macroprudential policy. International Journal of
Central Banking 9, 219–276.
Ghironi, F., 2006. Macroeconomic interdependence under incomplete markets. Journal of
International Economics 70, 428–450.
Gilchrist, S., Leahy, J.V., 2002. Monetary policy and asset prices. Journal of monetary
Economics 49, 75–97.
Guerrieri, V., Lorenzoni, G., 2011. Credit crises, precautionary savings, and the liquidity trap.
NBER No. 17583 .
Iacoviello, M., 2005. House prices, borrowing constraints and monetary policy in the business
cycle. American Economic Review 95, 739–64.
Iacoviello, M., Minetti, R., 2006. International business cycles with domestic and foreign
lenders. Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 2267–2282.
Iacoviello, M., Neri, S., 2010. Housing market spillovers: Evidence from an estimated dsge
model. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2, 125–64.
Jermann, U., Quadrini, V., 2012. Erratum: Macroeconomic effects of financial shocks. The
American Economic Review 102, 1186–1186.
Justiniano, A., Primiceri, G.E., Tambalotti, A., 2014. The effects of the saving and banking
glut on the us economy. Journal of International Economics 92, S52–S67.
Kannan, P., Rabanal, P., Scott, A.M., 2012. Monetary and macroprudential policy rules in a
model with house price booms. The BE Journal of Macroeconomics 12.
29
Khan, A., Thomas, J.K., 2013. Credit shocks and aggregate fluctuations in an economy with
production heterogeneity. Journal of Political Economy .
Kim, J., Kim, S.H., 2003. Welfare effects of tax policy in open economies: stabilization and
cooperation. Finance and Economics Discussion Series. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System 51.
Kiyotaki, N., Moore, J., 1997. Credit cycle. Journal of Political Economy 105, 211–248.
Lambertini, L., Mendicino, C., Punzi, M.T., 2013. Leaning against boom-bust cycles in credit
and housing prices. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 37, 1500–1522.
Lim, C.H., Columba, F., Costa, A., Kongsamut, P., Otani, A., Saiyid, M., Wezel, T., Wu,
X., 2011. Macroprudential policy: What instruments and how to use them? lessons from
country experiences. IMF Working Paper 11238 37.
Liu, Z., Wang, P., Zha, T., 2013. Land-price dynamics and macroeconomic fluctuations.
Econometrica 81, 1147–1184.
Mendicino, C., Pescatori, A., 2008. Collateralized household debt and monetary policy.
Manuscript .
Obstfeld, M., 2012. Financial flows, financial crises and global imbalances. Journal of Inter-
national Money and Finance 31, 469–480.
Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K., 1995. The intertemporal approach to the current account. Handbook
of International Economics 3, 1731–1799.
Piketty, T., Saez, E., 2003. Income inequality in the united states, 1913–1998. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 118, 1–41.
Punzi, M.T., 2013. Housing market and current account imbalances in the international
economy. Review of International Economics 21, 601–613.
Sa, F., Towbin, P., Wieladek, T., 2012. Capital inflows, financial structure, and housing
booms. Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming.
Sa, F., Wieladek, T., 2011. Monetary policy, capital inflows and the housing boom. Global-
ization and Monetary Policy Institute WP 80, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas .
30
Schmitt-Grohe, S., Uribe, M., 2003. Closing small open economy models. Journal of interna-
tional Economics 61, 163–185.
Schmitt-Grohe, S., Uribe, M., 2005b. Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a medium-scale
macroeconomic model, in: Gertler, M., Rogoff, K. (Eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual.
MIT Press, pp. 383–425.
Schmitt-Grohe, S., Uribe, M., 2007a. Optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal
rules. Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 1702–1725.
Schmitt-Grohe, S., Uribe, M., 2007b. Optimal inflation stabilization in a medium-scale
macroeconomic model, in: Schmidt-Hebbel, K., Mishkin, R. (Eds.), Monetary Policy Under
Inflation Targeting. Central Bank of Chile, Santiago, Chile, pp. 125–186.
Schmitt-Grohe, S., Uribe, M., 2012. Prudential policy for peggers. NBER Working Papers .
Shourideh, A., Zetlin-Jones, A., 2012. External financing and the role of financial frictions
over the business cycle: Measurement and theory, in: 2012 Meeting Papers, Society for
Economic Dynamics.
Taylor, J., 2007. Housing and monetary policy, in: Housing, Housing finance and monetary
policy. Federal reserve Bank of Kansas City, Kansas City.
Tillmann, P., 2013. Capital inflows and asset prices: Evidence from emerging asia. Journal
of Banking and Finance 37, 717–729.
Warnock, F., Warnock, V., 2009. International capital ows and u.s. interest rates. Journal of
International Money and Finance 28, 903–919.
Wolff, E.N., 2010. Recent trends in household wealth in the united states: Rising debt and
the middle-class squeeze-an update to 2007. Working paper, Levy Economics Institute .
31
Table 1: Targets
Annual rate of return 4%
Borrowers share housing wealth 40%
Borrowers share of income 60%
Residential investment/GDP 4.56%
Housing wealth to GDP 127.85%
Household Credit to total housing wealth 45.45%
Trade deficit to annual GDP 2.73%
std (real house prices)/std (GDP) 2.98%
std (housing value)/std (household credit) 1.15%
std(US real house prices)/std (foreign real house prices) 1.39%
std(US term interest rates)/std(foreign short term interest rates) 1.26%
std (current account/GDP) 1.09%
Table 2: Parameters’ Values
β1 Discoun factor Savers 0.99 θ Calvo parameter 0.67
β2 Discount factor Borrowers 0.95 γ labor share in production 0.057
νL Labor preference parameter 1 α capital share in production 0.3
η Laborpreferenceparameter 2 Xss marg.cost of production 1.10
κ Housing preference parameter 0.17 ψh Adj cost housing 0.5
m Loan-to-value ratio 0.73 ψk Adj cost capital 0.5
δh Housing depreciation parameter 0.0089 ϕ risk premium elasticity 0.001
δk Capital depreciation parameter 0.025 φpi taylor-rule parameter 1.5
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Table 3: Variance Decomposition
Housing Monetary Credit Risk Foreign
Preference Policy Shock Premium Disc. Factor
(γh,t) (εr,t) (γm,t) (γς,t) (γb,t)
CAt 12.15 33.22 5.22 49.07 0.03
qh,t 70.28 0.25 8.77 20.02 0.04
b2t 66.55 0.63 30.74 1.99 0.01
The table reports the variance share of key shocks of the forecast errors
of the current account (CAt), house prices (qh,t) and household debt (b2t).
Table 4: Welfare Gains – Interest Rate Rules
Welfare
Social Savers Borrowers
A.1 Ad Hoc Interest-Rate Rules (m=0.73)
(i) φpi =1.5; 0.2865 5.9140 4.5472
(ii) φpi=1.5; φy=0.5; 0.2826 5.9241 4.4680
(0.0101) (-0.3952)
A.2 Optimized Interest-Rate Rules (m=0.73)
(iii) φpi=7.1;φy=0; φb=1.8; 0.3636 15.8605 4.1007
(10.4580) (-2.2076)
(iv) φpi=4; φy=0; φq=1.9; 0.3629 14.2531 4.4076
(8.6967) (-0.6954)
Second-order approximation. In parenthesis, individual welfare gains w.r.t. the baseline policy,
i.e. interest-rate response to inflation coupled with a constant LTV ratio, rule (i).
Negative welfare gains indicate losses. φi = [pi, y, b, q] indicates the inflation coefficients in the interest-rate rule.
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Table 5: Welfare Gains – LTV Ratio Rules
Welfare
Social Savers Borrowers
B.1 Optimized LTV (φpi=7.1;φy=0; φb=1.8)
m = 0.73 (rule iii) 0.3636 15.8605 4.1007
(v) ϕb = 0 0.3636 15.8605 4.1007
- -
(vi) ϕy = 0 0.3636 15.8605 4.1007
- -
(vii) ϕq = 1.4 0.7229 21.7343 10.1121
(6.0497) (35.0629)
(viii) ϕq/q∗ = 0 0.3636 15.8605 4.1007
- -
B.2 Optimized LTV (φpi=4; φy=0; φq=1.9)
m = 0.73 (rule iv) 0.3629 14.2531 4.4076
(ix) ϕb = 0 0.3629 14.2531 4.4076
- -
(x) ϕy = 0 0.3629 14.2531 4.4076
- -
(xi) ϕq = 1.8 0.6525 54.4806 2.1534
(49.5222) (-10.6590)
(xii) ϕq/q∗ = 1.9 0.5723 52.5722 0.9320
(46.6958) (-15.9519)
Second-order approximation. In parenthesis, individual welfare gains w.r.t. the constant LTV
policy, i.e. rule (iii) in PANEL B.1 AND rule (iv) in PANEL B.2. Negative welfare gains indicate losses.
φi, with i = [pi, y, b, q], indicates the coefficients in the interest-rate rule, whereas ϕj , with j = [q, b],
indicates the coefficients in the LTV rule.
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Table 6: Level and Stabilization Effect – Interest Rate Rules
(A) (B)
Monetary Policy: φpi=7.1;φy=0; φb=1.8; φpi=4;φy=0; φq=1.9;
LTV Policy: m = 0.73 ϕq = 1.4 m = 0.73 ϕq = 1.8 ϕq/q∗ = 1.9
(rule iii) (rule vii) (rule iv) (rule xi) (rule xii)
(I) std relative to baseline
b2/Y 0.9527 0.2426 0.8857 0.9248 0.9092
qh/Y 1.0753 0.6034 0.9161 1.1305 1.0256
IH/Y 1.0604 0.5875 0.8836 1.0511 0.9542
C/Y 0.6724 0.3184 0.6652 0.4411 0.4040
C1/Y 0.4704 0.2434 0.5261 0.3292 0.2963
C2/Y 1.3191 0.5437 1.1996 1.6283 1.5046
Real Rate 0.9945 0.3603 1.2585 1.2476 1.2016
BF /Y 1.2082 0.3499 1.1591 1.1591 0.4684
qh/q
∗
h 1.0048 1.3553 1.0070 1.6148 0.9200
(II) mean relative to baseline
b2/Y 1.1940 2.6539 1.0481 1.0481 2.0307
qh/Y 1.3335 0.3670 1.1815 1.1815 0.0600
IH/Y 0.8474 1.6065 0.7854 0.7854 1.1991
Second-order approximation. Stochastic mean and standard deviations under the full set of shocks
computed under the optimized interest-RATE rules. The table report the values in percentage
difference w.r.t. baseline policy (rule i).
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Table 7: Welfare Gains and Sources of Fluctuations
Social Welfare Savers’ Gains Borrowers’ Gains
(A) Baseline Policy
rule i φpi = 1.5; m = 0.73
all shocks 0.2865 - -
domestic 0.2662 - -
foreign 0.1541 - -
(B) Constant LTV
rule iii φpi = 7.1;φy = 0;φb = 1.8; m = 0.73
all shocks 0.3636 (10.4420) (-2.1933)
domestic 0.4272 (19.1439) (-1.4080)
foreign 0.0802 (-3.6539) (-3.6013)
rule iv φpi = 4;φy = 0;φq = 1.9; m = 0.73
all shocks 0.3629 (8.6966) (-0.6955)
domestic 0.4243 (17.1122) (0.0077)
foreign 0.0851 (-3.9875) (-2.7922)
(C) Dynamic LTV
rule vii φpi = 7.1;φy = 0;φb = 1.8; ϕq = 1.4
all shocks 0.7229 (17.1405) (32.0822)
domestic 0.5758 (11.7185) (21.9835)
foreign 0.4954 (13.8812) (23.5304)
rule xi φpi = 4;φy = 0;φq = 1.9; ϕq = 1.8
all shocks 0.6525 (62.5249) (-11.2804)
domestic 0.5119 (5.0813) (-14.8115)
foreign 0.4508 (30.9152) (2.7749)
rule xii φpi = 4;φy = 0;φq = 1.9; ϕq/q∗ = 1.9
all shocks 0.5723 (59.4514) (-16.5364)
domestic 0.3079 (26.9073) (-17.8457)
foreign 0.5041 (52.7356) (-7.0935)
Second-order approximation. Social welfare level and individual welfare gains w.r.t. the baseline policy (rule i).
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Figure 1: Current Account (%gdp) (right axes) vs Real House Price (left panel, left axes) and Real Home
Mortgage to House Value (right panel, left axes).
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Figure 2: U.S. Data
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Figure 3: Rest of the World Data
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Figure 7: Welfare w.r.t. interest-rate response to financial variables.
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Figure 8: Monetary policy shock under rule i (starred line), rule iii (solid line) and rule iv (dashed line)
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Figure 9: Monetary policy shock under rule iii (solid line) and rule vii (dashed-dotted line)
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